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BOOK REVIEWS
HOW SENIOR LEADERS VIEW THE WORLD
Saunders, Elizabeth N. Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions. Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell Univ. Press, 2011. 320pp. $35
In today’s political environment, mili-
tary intervention is frequently debated. 
These discussions often bring to light 
interesting points of agreement and per-
haps surprising instances of disagree-
ment. In the end, it is with the president 
that the final decision rests. Elizabeth 
Saunders explores the rationales that 
U.S. presidents have used for decid-
ing whether or not to initiate military 
interventions. Dr. Saunders, a graduate 
of Yale, now teaching at George Wash-
ington University, advances a thesis 
that the model of intervention depends 
mainly on a president’s formative ways 
of thinking about foreign policy. While 
it may seem that these views would fol-
low party lines, Saunders shows that this 
is not necessarily true. On one hand, the 
internal approach focuses on how the 
foreign state is organized and follows 
the transformative model. In contrast, 
the external approach looks at states’ 
outward behavior and uses a surgical 
strike–type model to coerce change in 
behavior. The author chose to examine 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, 
and Lyndon B. Johnson for two impor-
tant reasons. First, among the three a 
consensus would be expected based on 
the prevalent Cold War mentality and 
context. In fact, these three did not fol-
low in lockstep. The shared case of Viet-
nam, the second reason for the author’s 
selections, highlights their differences. 
Eisenhower was an externally focused 
president; if states’ external policies were 
successful, he chose largely to ignore 
internal issues in those same states. 
A decreased priority on conventional 
forces translated under Eisenhower 
to less investment in transformative 
capabilities. Lebanon was his only 
overt intervention; Eisenhower did not 
intervene in Vietnam in 1954 or in Iraq 
in 1958. In contrast, Kennedy sought to 
influence states’ domestic institutions. 
His predetermined agenda, based on his 
congressional career, explains his choice 
and method of intervention in Vietnam. 
This theme held true with the murder of 
Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, which preced-
ed Kennedy’s own assassination by only 
a few weeks. Johnson, despite his obvi-
ous ties to Kennedy, was an externally 
focused president as regarded foreign 
affairs. Saunders highlights that while 
this diverges from his transformative 
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domestic agenda, it explains Johnson’s 
expansion of the Vietnam War in such 
a different direction from Kennedy.
The well-researched text concludes 
by looking beyond Vietnam at how 
well the pattern holds under differ-
ent circumstances and time periods, 
to include the Iraq war. Saunders’s 
framework categorizes presidents as 
belonging to either of two ideal types. 
While this may hold from a strictly 
political science view, it falls short of 
the reality of history. For this reason, 
the book will appeal more to politi-
cal scientists or those seeking model-
centric explanations of events. This 
work should also have strong appeal 
for strategists and people serving on 
planning or policy staffs. Understand-
ing how senior leaders view the world 
is often as significant as factual knowl-
edge of a given situation when provid-
ing recommended courses of action. 
LT. COL. FREDERICK H. BLACK, JR., U.S. ARMY
Naval War College 
Marrin, Stephen. Improving Intelligence Analysis: 
Bridging the Gap between Scholarship and Prac-
tice. New York: Routledge, 2011. 192pp. $130
A former CIA analyst turned scholar, 
Stephen Marrin attempts to bridge the 
gap between intelligence studies as an 
academic discipline and intelligence as 
a bureaucratic function. His analysis 
grounded in the intelligence litera-
ture, Marrin provides readers a good 
overview of such intelligence-studies 
classics as those of Sherman Kent, 
Roger Hilsman, and Richards Heuer, 
along with more contemporary work 
by Roger George, James Bruce, Richard 
Betts, and Amy Zegart. Marrin certainly 
displays a penchant for the academic 
that is informed by his former role 
as an intelligence analyst. He believes 
“intelligence scholarship can provide 
knowledge and insight useful for the 
analytic practitioner; so useful in fact, 
that it will help improve the quality of 
the resulting intelligence analysis.” 
With such a goal, Marrin offers six 
ways to improve intelligence analysis, 
but it is unclear how he derives these. 
Marrin does not draw his conclusions 
from known cases of highly publicized 
intelligence assessments. In the case 
of Iraq, it would have been useful to 
illustrate why the State Department’s 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research had 
a better answer on the status of Iraq’s 
weapons of mass destruction program 
than the Defense Intelligence Agency. 
Had Marrin tested his advice against 
known intelligence failures or drawn 
from assessments of failed analysis, his 
advice would be more convincing.
With intelligence increasingly public 
and used to justify or explain foreign-
policy decisions, it seems one more 
piece of advice Marrin could offer 
is how to incorporate public discus-
sions or open sources into analysis. 
Fortunately or not, the intelligence 
community does not have a mo-
nopoly on the “facts,” so discussing 
the ways in which analysts can more 
readily connect with scholars and 
the private sector would be useful. 
To be fair, the book is focused on 
intelligence analysis, but it seems to 
ignore how, why, and where facts are 
collected. In an era when both schol-
ars and private citizens have access 
to information, it is important that 
Marrin address the epistemological 
underpinnings of what is being ana-
lyzed. There is a logical and important 
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relationship between collection and 
analysis that is in need of further study.
In spite of the book’s shortcomings, 
Marrin offers readers a look at what 
a junior CIA analyst does and offers 
a sketch of how to move beyond the 
“generalized intuition” that often afflicts 
intelligence analysis. His discussion of 
improving intelligence analysis through 
empathy is interesting and has implica-
tions for personnel recruiting. In fact, 
this slim volume should be valued by 
human-resources departments and 
senior managers as they prepare for the 
next reorganizations of their agencies.
DEREK REVERON
Naval War College
Rickards, James. Currency Wars: The Making of 
the Next Global Crisis. New York: Penguin Group, 
2011. 304pp. $26.95
Is the United States now engaged in a 
currency war? Are we involved in an 
international competition of currency 
devaluation that will impact America 
in seldom-studied ways that are critical 
to its defense? James Rickards suggests 
that we are, and that today’s cur-
rency war could be as devastating to 
national security as any kinetic war. 
James Rickards is a counselor, invest-
ment banker, and risk manager with 
over thirty years of experience in 
capital markets. He advises the De-
partment of Defense, the intelligence 
community, and major hedge funds 
on global finance. He served as a fa-
cilitator for the first-ever financial war 
games conducted by the Pentagon.
Rickards argues that currency con-
flicts should and must interest our 
military leaders. Such conflicts can 
and should be prepared for, because 
the cheap-dollar policies of both the 
present and immediate past administra-
tions portend a dollar crisis. Rickards 
argues that policy makers have lost the 
enormous national-security advan-
tages that dollar hegemony affords, 
by adopting weak-dollar policies. 
In part 1 Rickards discusses Pentagon-
sponsored “war” gaming in 2009, using 
rules of engagement (ROE) in which the 
only “weapons” allowed were currencies, 
stocks, bonds, and derivatives. Because 
the specific ROE were unrealistic, 
however, the results were inconclusive, 
although useful for future simulations. 
Then, in part 2, the author delves into 
historical accounts of what he calls 
“Currency War I” (1921–36) and 
“Currency War II” (1967–87). Rickards 
argues that we have now entered 
“Currency War III,” the three primary 
combatants being the United States, 
China, and Europe. He argues that there 
are four possible outcomes of Currency 
War III: a move to multiple reserve cur-
rencies, with the dollar playing a much 
smaller role; an International Monetary 
Fund–controlled world money, called 
“Special Drawing Rights”; a return to 
the gold standard, at a substantially 
higher gold price (the prospect en-
dorsed by Rickards); and chaos. This last 
possibility and the associated dollar col-
lapse appears most likely to the author. 
It is unfortunate that Rickards did not 
include any reference to Edward S. 
Miller’s Bankrupting the Enemy: The 
U.S. Financial Siege of Japan before Pearl 
Harbor (Naval Institute Press, 2007), 
written by a skilled financial analyst 
who discusses in great detail how the 
Franklin D. Roosevelt administration 
used dollar hegemony to block Japan 
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from world financial markets. One 
could argue that Currency War I cul-
minated on 25 July 1941 with Executive 
Order 8832, which froze Japanese fi-
nancial assets. Dollar hegemony was an 
essential national-security tool used to 
deprive Japan of the resources needed to 
wage war. Miller’s work is a useful illus-
tration of the utility of a strong dollar.
In summary, Rickards provides an 
excellent account of the currency 
wars. He provides information that 
should be at the fingertips of ev-
ery national security planner. 
EDWARD FULLER, Incline Village, Nevada, and 
ROBERT C. WHITTEN, Cupertino, California
Leffler, Melvyn P., and Jeffrey W. Legro, eds. In 
Uncertain Times: American Foreign Policy after the 
Berlin Wall and 9/11. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. 
Press, 2011. 243pp. $19.95
This collection of ten essays focuses 
on the American government’s foreign 
policy through three administrations 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 
November 1989, and also after the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. 
Editors Melvyn Leffler and Jeffrey Legro 
examine these events from the perspec-
tives of both the policy makers who 
were active in Presidents George H. W. 
Bush’s, Bill Clinton’s, and George W. 
Bush’s administrations and scholars 
who have analyzed the government’s 
actions. Government response to these 
events provides strong examples of 
how the United States reacts in times 
of uncertainty. The editors chose the 
Berlin Wall and 9/11 because both 
events impacted the global order to an 
extent requiring a complete reexami-
nation of the nation’s foreign policy.
The chapters written by scholars 
provide excellent background, discuss-
ing the situations before, during, and 
after the events. However, the chapters 
written by government officials involved 
in policy decisions greatly enhance and 
increase the success of this work. The 
collaborators from these administra-
tions have yet to publish their individual 
memoirs, making their perspectives 
not only unique but refreshing.
In his essay, “Shaping the Future: Plan-
ning at the Pentagon, 1989–1993,” Paul 
Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense 
for Policy during George H. W. Bush’s 
administration and U.S. Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense during George W. Bush’s 
administration, discusses how defense 
decisions made at the end of the Cold 
War influenced decisions after 9/11. His 
analysis of the similarities between stra-
tegic decisions made in 1989 and 2001, 
as well as of the impact that the 1989 
decisions had on 2001 strategy plans, 
is one of the most interesting parts 
of this book. Eric Edelman also does 
this especially well in his “The Strange 
Career of the 1992 Defense Planning 
Guidance,” in which he compares the 
1992 Defense Planning Guidance to 
2002’s National Security Strategy. He 
served George W. Bush as Under Sec-
retary of Defense for Policy, as well as 
Principal Deputy Assistant to the Vice 
President for National Security Affairs. 
John Mueller, who holds the Woody 
Hayes Chair of National Security 
Studies at the Mershon Center, takes 
an approach different from those of 
his fellow collaborators in “Quest-
ing for Monsters to Destroy.” He adds 
2 September 1945, the end of World 
War II, and the Korean invasion by the 
North Koreans on 25 June 1950 as 
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equally important events for American 
foreign policy in times of uncertainty.
One of the major considerations for 
both policy makers and scholars is the 
impact these events had on the military. 
Whether to increase or decrease the ac-
tive forces was a complicated issue that 
caused disagreement among govern-
ment officials in both 1989 and 2001. 
Readers of this journal will find particu-
larly interesting the varying opinions 
regarding the military, especially in light 
of currently anticipated force restruc-
turings and budgetary constraints.
While each chapter can be read on its 
own, an author sometimes refers to 
another chapter, establishing a continu-
ity that may be lost or underappreciated 
otherwise. This is especially true for es-
says written by policy makers. The edi-
tors are to be congratulated on a timely 
and helpful volume that not only stud-
ies American foreign policy in the recent 
times of uncertainty but provides food 
for thought for the uncertainty of now. 
NORAH SCHNEIDER
Salve Regina University
Diamond, Larry, and Marc F. Plattner, eds. De-
mocratization in Africa: Progress and Retreat. 2nd 
ed. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 
2010. 360pp. $30 
In some ways, publishing a book that 
purports to capture contemporary 
African political trends, particularly 
involving the “progress of democracy,” 
faces the same basic problem as do 
books attempting to explain state-of-
the-art computers. Both information 
streams are now flowing so quickly that 
the truth you write about today may be 
very different from that of tomorrow. In 
fact, the African scholar has even harder 
going than his information-systems 
contemporary, because unlike computer 
technology, the course of democracy in 
Africa frequently changes direction and 
from time to time even reverses itself.
The editors of Democratization in Africa: 
Progress and Retreat are, as the title indi-
cates, well aware of this challenge. This 
is not surprising. This volume is part 
of the International Forum for Demo-
cratic Studies’ Journal of Democracy 
book series, and both Diamond and 
Plattner have edited numerous volumes.
The book is well written, well re-
searched, and well organized. The 
reader is first treated to a selection of 
seven readings, all looking at themes 
involving “progress and retreat.” The 
remainder of the book is divided into 
three sections, covering West Africa, 
East Africa, and southern and central 
Africa. Given the events in North Africa, 
the lack of coverage along Africa’s 
Mediterranean shore is regrettable and 
underscores the point about “lag time.” 
In general, the first section of the book 
is thought provoking and arguably 
the most useful. The topics are broad, 
and their panoramic view allows the 
authors to chart the many directions 
of emerging trends. For example, John 
Clark of Florida International Univer-
sity argues that the military coup as 
an instrument of regime change is in 
decline. While certain events indicate 
that the end of the African military 
coup is nowhere near in sight, in the 
main it seems that Clark is correct.
Despite the editors’ best efforts, shelf life 
remains a problem. Although updated 
for this new edition with new informa-
tion, many of the book’s chapters were 
written far enough in the past that the 
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situation itself is out-of-date. Despite 
the book’s 2010 publication date, 
twenty-one of the twenty-four essays 
here were originally published between 
2007 and 2009. Not all these essays are 
“expired,” Clark’s being a case in point. 
However, the careful reader is forced to 
spend far too much time checking other 
sources to learn the actual current “state 
of play.” In some cases, however, such 
as Côte d’Ivoire, the changes from the 
time of initial publication to the present 
is extreme. In others, such as Zimba-
bwe, current events have not called 
the author’s findings into question.
In the end, despite powerful writing, 
careful scholarship, and the best of 
intentions, Democratization in Af-
rica is too much of a “fly in amber.” 
Teachers, students, and lay readers 
alike would be better advised simply 
to subscribe to the Journal of Democ-
racy. For a slightly higher cost they 
would reap much greater gain.
RICHARD NORTON
Naval War College
Cohen, Eliot A. Conquered into Liberty: Two Cen-
turies of Battles along the Great Warpath That 
Made the American Way of War. New York: Free 
Press, 2011. 405pp. $30
The American way of war—a prod-
uct of two centuries of war with . . . 
Canada? How can that be? Civil War 
history and the experience and his-
tory of World War II have driven out 
of our minds a truth known to James 
Fenimore Cooper, Francis Parkman, 
and Kenneth Roberts. The American 
colonies, thereafter the United States, 
fought battle after battle with France, 
Britain, and Canada throughout most 
of the seventeenth century and un-
til the early nineteenth century. The 
place of these battles was then called 
the Great Warpath, stretching from 
Albany to Montreal and Quebec.
American readers who pick up Eliot 
Cohen’s Conquered into Liberty will 
most likely be embarrassed by learning 
how much they do not know (or only 
vaguely remember) about American 
war fighting in the colonial and early 
national periods. However, by the time 
the first chapter, about the Schenectady 
raid of 1690, is finished, American read-
ers will feel embraced, as though part of 
their American selves has been returned. 
Non-Americans will be surprised at first, 
and by the end of the book astonished.
Cohen teaches strategic studies at the 
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced 
International Studies, and he was a 
senior adviser to the secretary of state 
on strategic issues from 2007 to 2009. 
This book is a military history, as good 
a one as might ever be done. As a his-
torian, Cohen’s strongest suit is that he 
treats war as it is made by political and 
military leaders, by the regulars (and ir-
regulars and Native Americans), and by 
“leaders and managers who got things 
done.” By the last he means those (most-
ly citizen-soldiers) who improvised in 
combat and managed to supply forces 
under nearly impossible conditions. His 
insights regarding these sorts of men 
make up a large part of his understand-
ing of what the “American way of war” 
is about. Cohen quotes Germany’s 
Field Marshall Erwin Rommel to affirm 
that what was an eighteenth-century 
American quality has endured—the 
American speed of adaptation to 
armored warfare, Rommel wrote, is 
explained “by their extraordinary sense 
for the practical and the material and 
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by their complete lack of regard for 
tradition and worthless theories.”
American wars along the Great War-
path, Cohen reminds us, were parts 
of European wars. The Atlantic Ocean 
more linked us to Europe than it 
insulated us from it. Moreover, these 
wars exposed us to a full range of 
seventeenth-to-nineteenth-century 
European warfare, from set-piece 
battles to what could be called un-
conventional and secret warfare. They 
also brought the full horror of war to 
us. Cohen explodes the contemporary 
European notion that the United States 
did not become “the territory of war” 
or exposed to terror until 2001. Indeed, 
terror in the form of murderous raids 
on New York and New England villages 
marked much of its colonial period.
Among many other things, Cohen argues 
that the American appetite for the kind 
of unconditional surrender pursued by 
Franklin Roosevelt in World War II had 
its grounding in the eighteenth-century 
American intention to destroy the en-
emy polity that was Canada. More than 
that, America’s wars to attach Canada 
to itself were wars for the freedom of 
that polity. Cohen says, “If any countries 
have ever been ‘conquered into liberty,’ 
as the Continental Congress had written 
to the doubtful habitants of Canada 
in 1775, they were Germany, Italy, and 
Japan, occupied and transformed by 
armies that combined, in paradoxical 
degree, thoroughness in defeating an 
enemy and an unlimited, even naïve, 
commitment to liberating him.”
Cohen’s book is an astonishingly 
good read in addition to being highly 
thoughtful and often revelatory. 
KEN JENSEN
McLean, Virginia
Matzke, Rebecca Berens. Deterrence through 
Strength: British Naval Power and Foreign Policy 
under Pax Britannica. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska 
Press, 2011. 320pp. $45
Historians have long argued about the 
true mechanism behind a ninety-year 
period of relative peace in Europe, a 
period that began with the end of the 
Napoleonic wars and became known 
as the Pax Britannica. Over the years 
critics have questioned both aspects 
of this term—whether the period was 
actually as peaceful as its title suggests 
and whether that peace really was, 
in large part, due to Great Britain’s 
overwhelming and imposing com-
mercial, industrial, financial, and naval 
might. Through a searching analysis of 
political decision making during three 
different crises within an eight-year 
period, Rebecca Matzke’s book, itself a 
developed and published version of the 
author’s Cornell University dissertation, 
seeks to add weight to the notion that 
Britain did indeed use the strength and 
versatility of the Royal Navy as an effec-
tive deterrent force during this time. 
The author explains that on three sepa-
rate occasions between 1838 and 1846 
(Canadian trade and border disputes 
with the United States, 1838–42; the 
Syrian crisis, 1840–41; and the first 
Opium War of 1839–42), British politi-
cians, in particular Lord Palmerston, 
were not afraid to threaten the use of, or 
to use, naval power to further discrete 
British interests on the world stage and 
to coerce and influence the activities 
of their main rivals in Europe. In each 
case, while the immediate aim was 
obviously to benefit British regional 
activities, each was undertaken with 
an eye to preserving the broader peace 
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and stability of the international order 
as a whole. In other words, Britain’s 
defensive “status quo” policy was 
implemented by operationally offensive 
threats or means. Furthermore, Matzke 
clearly shows that the British politicians 
well understood that if they failed to 
respond to some of these lesser chal-
lenges (the Chinese opium war being a 
prime example), over time they risked 
weakening their ability to influence their 
major adversaries in the future, in situa-
tions where the stakes might be higher. 
During the course of her analysis, 
Matzke takes issue with established 
scholarship holding that the relative 
inactivity of the Royal Navy during this 
period was indicative of its compara-
tive weakness within Europe as a whole. 
On the contrary, she depicts an early 
Victorian navy that was well up to the 
task, possessing shipbuilding, logis-
tics, and manpower support superior 
to that of any competitor. It was this 
depth of capability that represented 
its major coercive value, particularly 
to the European rivals, often allow-
ing what she terms demonstrations of 
Thomas Schelling’s “skillful nonuse of 
military force.” Moreover, the British 
instinctively knew all this, giving them 
great confidence in their brinkmanship 
with rivals. The case of the successful 
coercion of France in the Egyptian/
Syrian crisis is a notable example.
Matzke’s work is meticulously re-
searched, using a wide array of contem-
porary archival material that focuses 
on the collected thoughts and writings 
of the main players involved, mate-
rial taken from their personal papers, 
letters, and diaries. The weakness in 
her work lies in the admittedly implicit 
assumption that this short period can 
be taken as truly illustrative of the 
situation throughout the whole of 
the Pax Britannica. Arguably, Matzke 
has found a narrow historical period 
where thesis and facts align, but she is 
less convincing over the broader time 
frame, and more work would likely be 
necessary to settle this point decisively. 
Less important, but nonetheless still 
of concern, is her rather rosy picture 
of the reliability of the steamships of 
the day. As John Beeler has forcefully 
demonstrated, truly globally deploy-
able, oceangoing steamers would have to 
wait until the late 1880s to be realized; 
their limitations until then, in terms of 
maintenance requirements and support 
while deployed, facts of which navies 
were only too well aware, do not come 
across well. That said, this is an impor-
tant work that successfully advances 
the study of British naval policy into 
an earlier period. When taken together 
with the more established scholarship 
of the late Victorian and Edwardian 
periods, it moves us closer to a more 
complete understanding of British 
efforts to wield naval power in sup-
port of a global free-trading system. 
As such, it has timeless relevance. 
ANGUS K. ROSS
Naval War College
Kleinen, John, and Manon Osseweijer, eds. Pi-
rates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia: Historical and 
Contemporary Perspectives. Singapore and Lei-
den: ISEAS Press and International Institute for 
Asian Studies, 2010. 312pp. $74
Liss, Carolin. Oceans of Crime: Maritime Piracy 
and Transnational Security in Southeast Asia and 
Bangladesh. Singapore and Leiden: ISEAS Press 
and International Institute for Asian Studies, 
2011. 446pp. $82.35
8
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These two books from the Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies Press share 
one single characteristic—a long delay 
between authorship and publica-
tion. This has no appreciable effect 
on Kleinen and Osseweijer’s edited 
collection, based on a 2005 confer-
ence, but it ill serves Carolin Liss. 
She evidently completed her book 
in 2006. Since then, however, vari-
ous maritime-security initiatives in 
the region whose births she observed, 
including the various Malacca Strait 
patrols and the ReCAAP information 
exchange, have matured. It would have 
been interesting to have her views on 
the decline in major incidents that 
gathered pace starting in 2005—as to 
the degree to which they contributed 
to this decline, and what caused the 
recent modest uptick in numbers. 
This is a disappointing shortcoming, be-
cause her survey up to 2006 adds much 
useful detail to what are now a number 
of well-established themes. Her contri-
butions are particularly welcome in two 
areas, first on small-scale piracy. There 
she advances a persuasive argument that 
the general and substantial increase in 
fishing-boat numbers and the use of 
more sophisticated search equipment 
beginning in the 1950s (which resulted 
in widespread overfishing) and, within 
that overall picture, the malign effects 
of large and sophisticated foreign ships 
operating illegally contributed, pos-
sibly significantly, to the rise of piracy 
everywhere from the Philippines to 
Bangladesh. Also welcome is her critical 
examination of the political, practical, 
and moral effects of substituting private 
security companies for government-
provided security. Among several obser-
vations none is more germane than that 
private security would be unnecessary 
if governments had more interest in 
protecting maritime trade and made 
a better job of it when they try. This 
point has relevance to the waters off 
Somalia as well. If Liss misses anything, 
it is that governments prior to the 
modern naval era expected individual 
ships to look after themselves and that 
the return of piracy at the end of the 
twentieth century is producing an edg-
ing back toward a similar expectation.
Kleinen and Osseweijer’s book is the 
fourth in a series from ISEAS that has 
focused primarily on modern piracy 
in Southeast Asia. In contrast to its 
predecessors, half the book is devoted 
to historical cases. It contains a num-
ber of noteworthy contributions to the 
literature on piracy studies, ranging 
from an excellent chapter by one of the 
editors, John Kleinen (on the inappli-
cability of Eric Hobsbawn’s radical and 
romantic thesis that bandits could be 
Robin Hoods), to the historical experi-
ence of piracy in Asia. Robert Antony’s 
detailed study of the frontier town of 
Giang Binh adds to our knowledge 
of the late-eighteenth-century south-
ern Chinese “water world,” which 
was first explored by Dian Murray. 
The majority of the essays, however, 
concentrate on waters between the 
southern Philippines and Borneo, 
centered on the Sulu Archipelago. James 
Warren adds to his indispensable work 
on the Sulu Zone with a chapter on 
the workings of the Sulu slave market 
between 1800 and 1850. Esther Velthoen 
examines Dutch attempts to tame 
coastal raiding up until 1905, efforts 
that have some remarkable similarities 
to Roman attempts to curb Cilician 
piracy. Stefan Amirell describes the 
region between 1959 and 1963, when 
Britain was left as the sole colonial 
9
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power, struggling to contain an upsurge 
of piracy following the withdrawal of 
the Americans from the Philippines 
and the Dutch from Indonesia. Two 
complementary studies of the con-
temporary situation, one by Carolin 
Liss, from the perspective of Sabah, 
and the second by Ikuya Tokoro, from 
the perspective of Sulu, complete this 
examination of a region where piracy 
was, and to an extent remains, a way 
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